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1 Introduction
Celebrating the 58th anniversary of Indian
Independence in 2005, the Prime Minister of India,
Dr Manmohan Singh, urged every Indian to
contemplate what ‘independence’ meant. Are
ordinary people in India any more independent or
autonomous than they were under British
colonisation? If so, then autonomous of what and
from whom? It may have come to political leaders
who acquired high positions in a new government.
That autonomy meant a new regime, and that its
constituent office bearers were no longer
accountable to Britain. But the new regime was heir
to the British colonial government, not to the
freedom fighters (Kannabiran 2004: 27); it inherited
the laws and administration of colonial India. A vast
body of English laws not only survived in an
independent India, but continue to evolve by way of
amendments, abolition or judicial interpretation.
One colonial law that has remained since its
inception in 1860, is Section 377 of the Indian Penal
Code (IPC):
377. Unnatural Offences
Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against
the order of nature with any man, woman or
animal shall be punished with imprisonment for
life, or with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to ten years, and
shall also be liable to fine. (Ranchhoddas and
Thakore 2002: 1818)1
In this article, I argue that Section 377 is an assault
on the personal liberty of every free Indian. It
violates autonomy, independence, free will and
sovereignty of the people over their own bodies. My
analysis is limited to consensual sexual activity
between adults, ruling out rape or child abuse; and
is further limited to the judicial scrutiny of human
rights.
2 Defining sexualities
There is a wide spectrum of sexual acts, practices
and identities the world over. The existing language
of sexuality and human rights, as it has evolved out
of judicial scrutiny in cases from outside of India, is
largely rooted in the context of same sex sexualities
and transgender identities. The movement around
sexual rights has borrowed from the existent
language of human rights, be that in demanding
decriminalisation of sodomy, anti-discrimination at
the workplace, or same sex civil partnership/marriage.
The rights most frequently engaged have ranged
from privacy and equality, to life and human dignity.
What form sexuality takes depends on a range of
factors: personal temperament, conservative or
liberal values, a sense of propriety or impropriety, and
so on. Regardless of its manifestation, dormant or
otherwise, sexuality remains an integral component
of human experience. Why must expressions of
sexuality have to be justified in terms of rights to
privacy, to equality, to human dignity? The same
range of rights applied to sexuality implicitly endorses
what can be called sexual autonomy. The integral
nature of sexuality to human experience, I argue
here, calls for a distinct human right, namely the
right to sexual autonomy (RSA).
The subject of sexuality poses a peculiar definitional
challenge, not entirely because the subject is
expansive, rather that terminology is a matter of
ideological or contextual preference. Some scholars
seek to reclaim the term ‘homosexual’ in an
endeavour to give the term a breadth and modernity
it has really never had (Macdougall 2000). Others
refuse to use ‘homosexual’ because it is irrevocably
tainted by years of use in a pejorative sense
(Wintemute 1994). My definitional preference in this
article is contextual. My analysis focuses on Section
377 and asks: What is the status of sexuality in
58
Sodomy in India: Sex Crime or
Human Right?
Sumit Baudh*
IDS Bulletin Volume 37  Number 5  October 2006  © Institute of Development Studies
2Armas37.5.qxd  02/11/2006  16:13  Page 58
Section 377? What is ‘carnal intercourse against the
order of nature’? The primary questions I will address
will be: is not the offence of ‘carnal intercourse’
directly repugnant to the rights to sexual autonomy?
If so, does defining a right to sexual autonomy more
effectively challenge the notion of ‘unnatural
offences’ in comparison with arguments of privacy,
equality, life and/or human dignity?
3 Compulsory heterosexuality
What does Section 377 have to say about sex,
sexuality or sexual orientation? Nothing on the face
of it. A plain reading of the law reveals little and is
actually quite ambiguous. To begin with, what does
‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’
actually mean?
The available case law makes frequent references to
bestiality, buggery and biblical notions of the sin of
Gomorrah and the sin of Sodom. That in itself is of
little help. The meaning of sodomy has varied across
centuries, continents and cultures.2 Even its legal
interpretation varies from one jurisdiction to another.
Legal definitions of buggery and bestiality are
similarly difficult to capture. There is a hint in the
statutory explanation appended to Section 377. It
states that ‘penetration’ is sufficient to constitute
‘carnal intercourse’, but does not clarify penetration
of what and by what? From a reading of case law, it
appears that penile penetration (of the anus or the
mouth) is what is being alluded to.3 Even penile
masturbation of one person by another is considered
penetration.4
In a study of Indian judgements under Section 377, a
total of 46 cases reveals that more than 60 per cent of
cases deal with child sexual abuse by men. Out of
these, 20 cases involve male children and ten involve
female (Narrain 2004: 55). Not that consent is at all an
ingredient of the offence, but all these 30 cases are
obviously non-consensual. Even in those cases that do
involve consensual adults, there is no judicial scrutiny
over the element of consent. Some men in these
cases are referred to as ‘habitual sodomite/catamite’
but the judgements are emphatic that prior sexual
history or the fact that the accused male wore female
attire is of no relevance. Gender and sexuality have
thus found little open articulation in the Indian judicial
discourse. It is consistently and implicitly held that only
penile–vaginal penetration conforms to the order of
nature.
The element of consent has been obliquely
considered in a divorce case. In this case, the wife
alleged cruelty, caused by repeated acts of
penile–anal penetration by the husband. It was held
that a husband could indeed be ‘guilty of sodomy on
his wife if she was not a consenting party’.5 Although
a civil case (as opposed to being a criminal
prosecution under Section 377), it is a significant
remark on the element of consent. What indeed if a
woman consents to ‘sodomy’ with a man? The
question has apparently not caught the judicial
imagination.
There was a public scandal in Delhi in December
2004 over an oral sex episode between a boy and a
girl, both in their mid-teens. The boy recorded the act
on his mobile camera-phone. Later, through a multi-
media messaging service (MMS), he circulated the
video clip to some of his friends. The clip eventually
found its way onto the internet, and was available for
public view and purchase. There was a police
investigation and the boy was arrested, although not
under Section 377 (The Hindu 2004). It did not catch
media attention, or police investigation, that
penile–oral penetration is an ‘unnatural offence’, and
that the girl was equally liable. Had it been a boy in
place of the girl, it might have had very different
implications: they could both face imminent and real
risk of prosecution under Section 377.
In January 2006, four men were arrested in
Lucknow, the capital of Uttar Pradesh, under Section
377. Without any instigation or complaint, the police
had traced the phone number of one of the accused
on a gay website, and arranged a meeting. The police
then forced him to call his friends, three of whom
actually turned up. All four were arrested under a
false case of having sex in public. In this sting
operation, four innocent persons were thus
prosecuted in an obviously fabricated case only
because of their perceived sexual identity.6
As evidenced in the oral sex case in Delhi, a
consensual heterosexual act, even if it is not
penile–vaginal penetration, is unlikely to be the
subject of Section 377. On the other hand, the four
men in Lucknow are currently facing prosecution
because of their (homo)sexual identity. The
underlying and unquestioned premise is that
heterosexuality is ‘normal’ or ‘natural’. Conversely, all
that is outside of this heterosexuality is ‘abnormal’ or
‘unnatural’. By sanctioning what is ‘unnatural’, namely
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non-heterosexual sex, the law makes it compulsory
that sexual activity be sought exclusively within the
boundaries of heterosexuality – between a man and
woman. Section 377 in effect imposes compulsory
heterosexuality (Menon 2005). It takes away the
erotic and sexual self-determination of every person.
This carries special significance in the context of laws
that emerged in or are based on colonial regimes.
Claiming Bahamian women’s erotic and sexual
autonomy, Jacqui Alexander (1997) argues that
heteropatriarchy is used to continue and perpetuate
a colonial inheritance and to enable the political and
economic processes of re-colonisation. She defines
re-colonisation as ‘the attempts by the state, and the
global economic interests it represents, to achieve a
psychic, sexual and material usurpation of the self-
determination of the Bahamian people’ (Alexander
1997: 63–100). In a similar vein, an instrument of
heteropatriarchal oppression, Section 377 enables
the state to stigmatise, persecute and place under
constant surveillance and control those who have sex
in ways other than penile–vaginal penetration.
4 Existing legal arguments
Sodomy laws like Section 377 have been a subject of
judicial review the world over. The European Court
of Human Rights declared such laws as violations of
the right to privacy.7 A similar stand was later taken
by the United Nations Human Rights Committee.8
The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that sodomy laws violate both privacy rights and
equal protection under the law.9 The Constitutional
Court of South Africa has ruled that such a law
violates the right to privacy, the right to equality, and
also the right to human dignity.10
The three broad strands of legal arguments that
emerge out of judicial decriminalisation are thus
privacy, equality and human dignity.11 In the privacy
argument, everyone’s choice of sexual conduct is
seen as a private affair, which does not warrant
undue state intervention. Indulgence in ‘carnal
intercourse against the law of nature’ thus becomes
a fundamental choice. In the equality rights
argument, sexual orientation is seen as an immutable
status, similar to phenomena of race or sex. ‘Carnal
intercourse against the law of nature’ is understood
to be a derivative of distinct sexual orientation(s). For
this argument, it is necessary to conceptualise and
contrast sexual identities like heterosexual and
homosexual. Just as the heterosexual is naturally
inclined to penile–vaginal penetration, the
homosexual is seen to be similarly inclined to ‘carnal
intercourse against the law of nature’. There is a
claim of equality between the homosexual and the
heterosexual as two different classes of people. In
the human dignity argument, people who desire and
indulge in ‘carnal intercourse against the law of
nature’ are seen as a permanent minority. This
minority is understood to have had a shared history
of oppression, which in turn is seen to have brought
them extreme disfavour and disrepute, hence a
violation of their right to live with human dignity.
Of the case law that contributed to the three
arguments, all cases without exception arose in the
context of ‘homosexual’, ‘gay and lesbian’ people. The
three arguments have done well in creating a
language of sexual rights, but not without some
generic limitations. There is a precondition of placing
people into neat categories – heterosexual or
homosexual, lesbian, gay or straight. In the privacy
argument it is implicit that most people are
heterosexual, there are a few who are not but they
should be allowed their private space. The human
dignity argument is founded on their seemingly
cohesive minority status. It implies heterosexuals are
the majority, and that there is a neat and clearly
identifiable minority with a shared collective history.
The equality argument places a homosexual on the
same footing as a heterosexual, but the necessary
comparator being the heterosexual. The underlying
premise being that if the heterosexual does
something, so can the homosexual. It is the
heterosexual who sets the frame. The homosexual
may borrow it, but is not allowed a new one.
Heterosexuality clearly emerges as the norm. Who
set this norm? It is this heteronormativity that
remains unchallenged in judicial human rights
discourse. Far from being challenged, it is not even
acknowledged.
5 Beyond sexual identities
There is a wide spectrum of gender and sexual
identities in India. There are ‘men who have sex with
men’ (MSM). Defying a strictly dichotomous gender
identity, there are hijras who claim to be a third sex
(Nanda 1990: 115). There are kothi men who display
exaggerated feminine mannerisms, and prefer anal
penetration by more masculine men. They also
identify as non-English-speaking and coming from
middle, lower income and working-class
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backgrounds (PUCL-K 2003). There are lesbian, gay,
bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people, who in India
are mostly urban, English-speaking, middle- and
upper-middle-class men and women. In addition,
each region of India has traditional identities that are
based on practices of gender and sexual non-
conformity (Narrain and Bhan 2005). Thus in India,
the realities of the non-normative experiences, i.e.
gender identities, sexual practices, sexual identities,
culturally sanctioned forms of erotic behaviour,
which contest the embedded nature of
heterosexism, have traditionally existed and continue
to exist in the contemporary context (Narrain and
Bhan 2005).
Sexual diversity in India poses a challenge to the
identity-based model implicit in the three legal
arguments. Those who do not conform to prescribed
sexual orientation identities will fall beyond its
purview. For example, hijras could be men who cross-
dress, castrated men, or those who are intersexed. An
indigenous identity, hijra is not a sexual identity but
more of a gender identity – the ‘third sex’ as it is
sometimes called. Neither man nor woman, a hijra’s
sexual acts (for instance, with men) then defy
understanding through both heterosexual and
homosexual categories. Further, as a community, hijras
have a unique and indeed much longer history that
cannot be so easily clubbed with the comparatively
infantile LGBT identities in India. Lastly, in some
regions, the sexual activity of hijras occurs in what are
called hamams (public bath houses). Perhaps closest in
comparison with brothels, the status of hamams in
the privacy argument is left in the lurch. Another
difficulty with privacy is that not everyone can afford
it. hijras and kothi men who indulge in sex work often
solicit on streets, leading to sex in public toilets or
public parks. Far from toilet-fetish or the excitement
of outdoor sex, this happens due to a lack of available
‘private’ spaces. Within the sanitisation of the privacy
argument, where and how does one accommodate
the realities of hijra lives? Is it best ignored because of
the complexity hijras pose? What then of hijra’s sexual
rights; their human rights?
Although located squarely in the context of same sex
sexualities and transgender identities, a broader
premise common to the three arguments is sexual
autonomy: that there is right to privacy of sexual
expression, that sexuality should not be a ground for
unjust discrimination, and that sexual conduct is part
of the experience of being human – the three
arguments acknowledge and endorse sexual diversity
and autonomy. Notwithstanding its location in the
same sex sexual identities, the generic potential of
sexual autonomy is much wider. It is possible to
present the world with a dynamic, pluralistic view of
law, culture and sexuality that transcends the
limitations of an identity-based model.
6 The right to sexual autonomy
Stephen Schulhofer defines sexual autonomy
primarily in terms of the freedom to seek sexual
fulfilment and freedom from sexual coercion. The
right to sexual autonomy should include providing
legal protection to permit individuals to identify with
a particular gender identity or sexual orientation.
Both the private and public aspects of one’s sexual or
gender identity should be protected as a legitimate
choice of sexual self-determination (Katyal 2002).
Using sexual autonomy as a conceptual framework
avoids the problems of exclusion of the Indian men
who have sex with men, for example, who are often
left outside of categories of protection based on
sexual orientation, because they might view
themselves as heterosexual. This framework also
harmoniously coexists with identity-based models. It
is entirely possible to have a non-discrimination
clause based on sexual orientation and to construe
the right to privacy to include aspects of a person’s
sexual identity (Katyal 2002).
The language of international human rights is
dynamic and is constantly expanding to articulate a
rights-based approach to more and more issues. A
landmark break from the hierarchies of rights,
human rights are now understood to be ‘universal,
indivisible, and interdependent and interrelated ...’12
Aspects of human life, be they health, livelihood, or
shelter, are being increasingly articulated in a rights-
based language. Sexuality is an undeniable strand of
human experience. Then, what keeps it from having
its own place, its own articulation in the spectrum of
human rights?
The human rights regime in India is also constantly
expanding. Earlier thought to be located exclusively
in civil and political rights (Part III of the Indian
Constitution), rights later entered the practice of
judicial intervention, and justiciability was extended
to some of the socioeconomic rights (Part IV of the
Constitution). Rights to privacy, health, livelihood and
shelter were not articulated at the time of the
framing of the Constitution but were later held to
IDS Bulletin Volume 37  Number 5  October 2006 61
2Armas37.5.qxd  02/11/2006  16:13  Page 61
be a part of Article 21, which specifies the
protection of life and personal liberty.13 Explicit
constitutional guarantees are indeed far more stable
and strong than Article 21, but the law is dynamic
and must cater to changing times and emerging
movements. The enthusiasm demonstrated by the
Indian judiciary in expanding the language of human
rights is preferable to the alternative of a rigid and
stagnant body of human rights. In line with this
enthusiasm, more and more could be read into the
right to life and personal liberty. In that vein, there is
a possibility that sexual autonomy could be read into
Article 21; though it would really be better to
articulate sexual autonomy as an explicit
constitutional guarantee, in Part III of the
Constitution.
A right to sexual autonomy would go a long way, not
only in challenging ‘carnal intercourse against the law
of nature’ and realising the rights of same sex
sexualities and transgender identities, but also in
evolving a rights-based approach to a whole spectrum
of issues including gender, abortion, pleasure, sex work,
sexual diversity and reproductive and sexual health.
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detailed comments; and to my colleagues at
AMAN Trust: Richa Singh, with whom I had useful
discussions and Dilip Simeon and Juhi Tyagi for
their critical inputs on the draft; to my activist
friends, Arvind Narrain and Pramada Menon for
their timely and insightful comments; and to the
Institute of Development Studies (IDS) for giving
me the opportunity to present it to a wider
audience at the workshop ‘Realising Sexual
Rights’, 28–20 September 2005, which allowed
me to gain valuable feedback, especially that from
Sonia Corrêa and Susie Jolly.
1 A general comment states that ‘[t]his section is
intended to punish the offence of sodomy,
buggery and bestiality. The offence consists in
carnal knowledge committed against the order of
nature by a person with a man, or in the same
unnatural manner with a woman, or by a man or
woman in any manner with an animal’. A much
older commentary, by Sir Hari Singh Gour states
‘This section punishes what is “unnatural” carnal
intercourse, and which is accounted a great crime
since the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah.
But in spite of the high penalties to which it is
justly subject, it is a crime which seldom comes to
light, though it is notoriously widespread even in
high society, and it is certainly not confined to any
age or nationality, though it is a crime often
detected amongst school boys and prisoners’.
(Gour 1928: 1936)
2 ‘In various times and places everything from the
ordinary heterosexual intercourse in an atypical
position to oral contact with animals’. (Boswell
1980: 93)
3 ‘Lohana, Vasanthlal, Devchand vs State’ (1962) All
India Reporter, Gujrat: 252.
4 ‘Brother John Anthony vs The State’ (1992)
Criminal Law Journal: 1352.
5 ‘Grace Jayamani, Petitioner vs E.P. Peter,
Respondent’ (1982) All India Reporter, Karnataka: 46.
6 From an unpublished fact-finding report written
by Elavarthi Manohar of the National Campaign
on Sexuality Rights (NCSR), Tulika Srivastava of
Association for Advocacy and Legal Initiatives
(AALI), Lucknow, Jashodhara Dasgupta of
Sahayog, Lucknow, Maya Sharma of Parma,
Baroda, Vivek Divan, a human rights lawyer from
Bombay and Arvind Narrain of the Alternative
Law Forum, Bangalore. Some of the online





7 ‘Dudgeon vs United Kingdom’ (1981) Ser. A, No
45; ‘Norris vs Ireland’ (1988) Ser. A, No 142;
‘Modinos vs Cyprus’ (1993), Ser. A, No 259.
8 ‘Toonen vs Australia’, (Communication No
488/1992) UN Doc CCPR/C/50/488/1992 (1994).
9 ‘Lawrence & Garner vs State of Texas’,
www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/02pdf/02-
102.pdf; also see decision of the Kentucky
Supreme Court in ‘Commonwealth of Kentucky
vs Jeffrey Wasson’, 842 SW 2d 487 (1992).
10 ‘National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality vs
The Minister of Justice’, (1999) 1 SA 6.
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11 I have borrowed the first two from Wintemute’s
(1995: 17) classification. I have done away with
Wintemute’s third classification called ‘sex
discrimination argument’, because none of the
cases relevant to this essay bear any reference to
this argument. I have replaced it with the human
dignity argument, which has gained prominence
in the South African judgement, ‘National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality vs The
Minister of Justice’ (1999) 1 SA 6.
12 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna,
14–25 June 1993, www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/
huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?Open
Document
13 Constitution of India, Article 21: ‘Protection of life
and personal liberty. No person shall be deprived
of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law’.
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